This is the military power of Venezuela’s armed forces: how many soldiers, aircraft, tanks and ships does the country actually have?

There was a time when Venezuela was the military darling of the Caribbean. That’s no exaggeration: back in the 1980s, its pilots trained on U.S. bases and flew F-16 Block 15s, the same fighters protecting NATO airspace. The purchase was historic: 16 F-16As and 8 F-16Bs, with pilots trained in Arizona who came home convinced that Caracas could stand toe-to-toe with any neighbor.

But the years passed, sanctions hit, ties with Washington collapsed, and spare parts dried up. Today, the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB, from the Spanish Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana) are a giant with feet of clay: big on numbers and territory, but riddled with weaknesses. On paper, they look formidable: 109,000 active personnel, roughly 8,000 reservists, and a militia that ranges from 220,000 to 500,000 volunteers (the government once claimed 4.5 million, but no serious analyst buys that). Add the National Guard and auxiliary forces. It’s a structure built for territorial defense, not for projecting power beyond its borders.

Venezuelan military has lots of kit, most of it old

The ground arsenal reads like an old catalog with pages missing: 92 Russian T-72B1s, 81 French AMX-30Vs, 78 British Scorpion-90s, and 31 AMX-13s. Armored vehicles: 123 BMP-3s and 114 BTR-80As. Artillery: 48 self-propelled Msta-S, plus BM-21 and BM-30 Smerch rocket launchers. And in air defense, systems that sound like they’re straight out of a video game: S-300VM, Buk-M2, Pechora-2M and more than 200 ZU-23 guns. On paper, it’s a respectable arsenal. The problem is that not everything works as it should.

Here’s the uncomfortable truth: many of those armored vehicles are veterans from another era. The French AMX-30s and British Scorpions have been in service for decades, though Venezuela has tried to give them a second life with digital fire-control systems and thermal sights. The Scorpions, for example, were repaired and upgraded in 2021 after years of neglect. Are they useful? Yes, for fast patrols and mountain support. Are they any match for an Abrams or a Leopard? Not even close. The Russian T-72s are the backbone of Venezuela’s heavy armor, but spare parts come in drips and drabs. Each model “speaks” its own language and requires separate logistics chains, making any large-scale effort collapse under the country’s sanctions-strangled supply lines.

What are the strengths of the Venezuelan military?

That’s why the Venezuelan military leans on what it can actually sustain: light mobility, irregular warfare and terrain as its greatest ally. Deep jungle, mountain ranges, unforgiving rivers, and a climate that turns mechanized advances into a nightmare. In 2024, they inaugurated the Jungle Operations School, according to official statements, as part of a strategy to train troops for irregular combat. And Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López said it plainly at a recent event: defense is based on the “war of the entire people,” a doctrine designed to wear down an invading force for months.

Perhaps the ace up their sleeve is that the FANB is constantly active, even if not all units move at the same pace. The Escudo Bolivariano and Independencia 200 operations deploy troops weekly to hot zones against drug traffickers and irregular groups. The real muscle lies in the URRA rapid-reaction units, which conduct commando-style precision strikes, and in special forces like the UOTE, trained for complex tactical operations. They’re the ones getting muddy in Apure, Arauca and along the Colombian border, where clashes with armed groups are routine. These aren’t necessarily epic battles, but they are live-fire engagements.

What’s the status of the Venezuelan air force?

The air force, however, is a shadow of what it once was. Of the F-16s that made history, only three F-16A single-seaters and one F-16B two-seater remain operational, without air-to-ground capability and relying on unguided weapons. The crown jewel now is the Russian Su-30MK2. Of the 24 delivered between 2006 and 2008, the most reliable estimates say only 11 or 12 are combat-ready. They’re versatile and modern, but far too few to sustain an air campaign. The rest of the fleet is made up of Chinese K-8 trainers and transport helicopters. More than half of Venezuela’s long-range radar systems are out of service. In a conflict, the FANB would rely on denying airspace with surface-to-air missiles, not dominating it with fighters.

Venezuelan navy

And the Venezuelan navy? The picture is even more modest. In its boom years, Venezuela splurged on four Spanish-built Avante 2200 corvettes from Navantia, delivered between 2010 and 2012: Guaiquerí, Warao, Yekuana and Kariña. Today, only the Kariña is operational after undergoing maintenance in 2022–23. It’s a solid vessel: 98.9 meters long, 2,419 tons, a range of 3,500 nautical miles, and a flight deck with a hangar. Perfect for patrolling the EEZ, not for dominating the Caribbean. The other three are out of action: the Warao ran aground in Brazil and never returned, while the Guaiquerí and Yekuana have been tied up for years due to maintenance shortages and serious technical issues. Their two Type 209 submarines, veterans from the 1970s, and their old Lupo-class frigates also languish in dry dock. If war extends to the sea, the FANB cannot sustain a naval fight. The rest of the fleet consists of patrol boats and Iranian Peykaap III fast-attack craft. Mere mosquitos against any of the seven U.S. fleets operating in the region.

All of this is compounded by a silent enemy: the budget. Military spending dropped from 1.6 percent of GDP in 2020 to just 0.6 percent in 2022, according to World Bank data. Without money, there’s no maintenance, no modernization and no joint exercises. And it shows: high corruption, desertions and a lack of combined maneuvers make the armed forces more “capable on paper” than a cohesive fighting force. Salaries hover around $100 a month, according to international reports, which hurts morale and fuels personnel flight.

Could Venezuela resist an invasion? It depends on what “resist” means. Against a conventional force like the one the U.S. has deployed in the Caribbean in 2025 (aircraft carriers, F-35s, MQ-9 drones), Venezuela stands no chance in open battle. But in irregular warfare—in jungles and cities—it could drag out the conflict for months, even years. And that’s exactly what its doctrine is built for: making an invasion so costly that no one wants to pay the price. RAND and other think tanks agree: the conventional phase would be quick, followed by a long, bloody insurgency.

The FANB is like a warrior in patched armor: pieces of Russian, French and British steel, some gleaming, others rusting. It has strength in numbers and terrain, but lacks lubrication, cohesion and the breath needed to fight on equal terms. If Trump were to follow through on his threat and send troops tomorrow, it wouldn’t be a walkover—but it wouldn’t be a conventional war either. It would be a maze of jungle, ambushes and attrition. And there, Venezuela’s final card is patience.

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