NBA

Seven challenges for the new NBA as a potentially dangerous 2026 looms

Record revenues, soaring salaries and global ambition mask the fault lines that will test the NBA’s power, integrity and leadership in 2026.

Alonzo Adams

Juanma Rubio

Update: Jan 2nd, 2026 04:20 EST

The NBA is turning the page on the calendar year in an excellent place. There is nothing new or especially newsworthy about that – and that may be the best possible sign for a league that, in terms of popularity and economic power, is living through a golden age that looks almost permanent and was barely dented by the pandemic.

The numbers are staggering. Projected revenues for this season are already above $14.3bn, up from an already spectacular $12.7bn last year and a huge leap from the $8.8bn generated in 2018-19, just before Covid. The average franchise valuation has climbed to $5.5bn, a figure that keeps resetting itself almost permanently and opening doors that once seemed impossible. Last year saw the sale of two historic giants: the Boston Celtics for a little over $6bn and the Los Angeles Lakers for a valuation that will end up exceeding $10bn. In 2022, the average franchise was still worth under $3bn.

Player salaries have followed the same curve. The average salary is now above $12m, with every type of minimum contract north of $1m and the maximum this season close to $60m – Stephen Curry – while some deals already average more than that. Jayson Tatum’s most recent extension comes in at $62.7m per year, with projections pointing toward $1m per game ($82m a season) within the next five years and, before the decade is out, nine-figure salaries of at least $100m per season. In 2021 the average salary had not yet reached $9m; a decade ago it was below $5m.

No one, then, has much reason to complain. Wealth is guaranteed in the medium term thanks to the rollout of revolutionary new television contracts, the real engine of the league’s finances. Media rights are the backbone of the NBA and the primary source of income for franchises. They form part of Basketball Related Income (BRI) – revenues generated directly by the game itself: TV, merchandising, concessions, parking and so on. How that BRI is split between owners and players is always the central battleground in collective bargaining. Under the previous agreement, players received between 49% and 51% depending on variables; under the new one, they are guaranteed 51%, leaving 49% for ownership.

The salary cap depends entirely on BRI. When TV deals explode, so does the cap, and with it player contracts. The great turning point came in 2015, when the NBA signed a nine-year deal (2016-25) with Disney (ESPN and ABC) and Turner (TNT) worth about $24bn. The scale of that leap is clear when compared with the previous agreement, under which Disney paid roughly $485m per year and Turner around $445m. Annual income more than tripled, surpassing $2.6bn a year. The salary cap promptly went wild: $63m in 2014-15, $70m in 2015-16 – the final season of the old deal – and then $94m in 2016-17. A new world.

Looking further back, the growth has been vertiginous. Before the 1998-99 season, NBC and Turner agreed to pay a total of $2.6bn over four years. At that point the salary cap was $30m and the average player earned under $2.5m. That gave way to a $4.6bn deal over six seasons (ABC, ESPN and Turner), then to $7.4bn over seven, and finally to the 2016 agreement – $24bn over nine years – which has now been made to look like loose change by the new framework: $76bn over 11 years.

This record-breaking deal, which came into force this season, values national TV rights at more than $6.9bn per year, again close to triple the previous figure. The package mixes old and new players. Disney’s ESPN and ABC retain the premium rights, paying about $2.6bn annually, up from roughly $1.4bn. NBC returns to the NBA picture and Amazon Prime Video enters for the first time. TNT Sports, a fixture since the 1980s, is out. NBC will pay almost $2.5bn per year, with part of its package going to Peacock, while Prime Video will contribute around $1.8bn annually.

For fans, this creates a more expensive, fragmented and complex viewing landscape. But by all available metrics, it is working. Coverage from NBC and Amazon Prime has been widely praised and audiences have surged – figures of an 89% increase are being cited, the best numbers in 15 years – over the first third of the season, including the third edition of the NBA Cup. Part of that jump reflects new measurement methods, but there is also genuine organic growth.

So everything is fine… with caveats, as always in a league this vast and complex. 2026 arrives with major challenges on commissioner Adam Silver’s desk, several of which could define his legacy. These are the seven most significant.

Expansion returns to the table

The NBA has not added an expansion franchise since the Charlotte Bobcats arrived in 2004. Moving from 30 to 32 teams long felt inevitable, the next step after securing a new collective bargaining agreement and record-breaking TV contracts. Seattle – a long-standing sore point since the SuperSonics left for Oklahoma City in 2008 – and Las Vegas, already deeply embedded in NBA life, emerged as overwhelming favorites.

Momentum stalled, however. Silver became increasingly focused on Europe, and some owners questioned why revenues should be split 32 ways rather than 30. Yet less than a month ago, ahead of the NBA Cup final, the commissioner reopened the door publicly. Domestic expansion, he said, remains under evaluation, with Las Vegas, Seattle and other markets still on the table. Unlike Europe, he noted, domestic expansion means selling equity in the existing league, making the economics more complex.

Silver has made clear the idea is not gathering dust. Seattle and Las Vegas, he said, are “incredible cities”, and 2026 will be decisive. By the summer, the league expects to enter a more formal process, consulting owners and running economic scenarios. A decision is expected at some point during the year.

A pivotal European adventure

January is set to be a watershed month for European basketball. The NBA, working with FIBA, is preparing to move forward with a new competition that, barring a last-minute breakthrough that looks increasingly unlikely, will launch in direct competition with the EuroLeague, not alongside it.

Earlier this month Silver and FIBA secretary general Andreas Zagklis announced that the NBA will officially begin courting partners – clubs, owners and investors. January 15 is also the deadline for four EuroLeague shareholder clubs to renew their licenses through 2036: ASVEL, Fenerbahçe, Real Madrid and Barcelona. ASVEL is widely expected to leave; Fenerbahçe is negotiating amid reports that the NBA’s preferred Turkish partner is Galatasaray. Real Madrid and Barcelona are the biggest prizes.

Madrid, in particular, is the fulcrum. Its preference appears to lean toward the NBA project, but it risks being stranded in a dangerous limbo if it delays too long. Other EuroLeague clubs could vote to exclude it permanently from June onward if no agreement is signed by the January deadline. Barcelona initially moved in tandem with Madrid but now seems more inclined to stay with the EuroLeague, albeit while seeking exit clauses that clash with the long-term commitment the competition demands.

For Silver, this is a potentially transformative gamble. The target start date is October 2027, with a 16-team league – 12 permanent members and four qualifiers via the Basketball Champions League and domestic competitions. The aim is to multiply revenues and dominate top-tier markets such as Madrid, Barcelona, London, Paris and Milan, even if that marginalizes traditional powerhouses like Belgrade or Kaunas.

Critics argue the sport needs unity, not further fragmentation, and have called for a grand NBA-FIBA-EuroLeague agreement – an idea that has already died in countless meetings. As things stand, Europe appears headed toward two parallel competitions, one run by the NBA as a US-based sports business. That prospect has already triggered complaints from European governments and economic institutions.

A looming crisis in the WNBA

While the NBA sailed smoothly through its latest collective bargaining talks, the WNBA is facing the opposite scenario. Explosive growth in profile and revenue has rendered its labor agreement obsolete. Players exercised their legal right to opt out and are demanding dramatically improved conditions.

After two extensions, negotiations remain deadlocked and the threat of a stoppage – either a lockout by owners or a players’ strike – is very real. The players’ union, the WNBPA, has already voted overwhelmingly to authorize strike action if necessary.

In a statement, the union accused the league of clinging to “draconian provisions” that have unfairly restricted players for nearly three decades. The WNBA’s latest offer included sweeping changes: a maximum salary rising to $1.3m per year, potentially reaching $2m over the life of the deal; an average salary of about $530,000, with a ceiling of $770,000; and a minimum above $250,000. Those figures dwarf last season’s numbers – the max was $249,244, the average $120,000 and the minimum $66,079 – but players remain adamant that revenue sharing must change.

They are seeking a system in which players receive 30% of revenues, compared with more than 50% in the NBA. The league’s counteroffer exceeds 50% of net profits, but after expenses, that would leave players with under 15% overall.

A stoppage would be the first in WNBA history. The final deadline has already slid from October 31 to November 30 and then to January 9, with no breakthrough in sight. According to the union, 93% of players voted, and 98% authorized strike action.

This crisis lands squarely on Silver’s desk. Commissioner Cathy Engelbert, his own appointment, appears increasingly isolated, and a leadership change now looks likely once this bruising negotiation ends. Silver has publicly expressed optimism but acknowledged deep problems – economic and personal – within the league.

The stakes are enormous. Franchise valuations now approach $500m. The league has expanded from 12 teams in 2024 to 18, with more coming by 2030. The Golden State Valkyries have debuted to sellout crowds after paying a $50m expansion fee in 2023. New franchises in Portland and Toronto (2026), Cleveland (2028), Detroit (2029) and Philadelphia (2030) have each paid $250m. A new 11-year, $2.2bn TV deal is also in place.

Against that backdrop, players argue that receiving barely 9.3% of revenues is indefensible. Although the WNBA is no longer formally controlled by the NBA, Silver’s league still holds decisive influence, directly or indirectly, over more than 60% of it. The crisis is his problem.

A delicate decision involving the Clippers

Just before this season began, an investigation by journalist Pablo Torre raised questions that strike at the heart of the NBA’s credibility: a possible circumvention of the salary cap involving Kawhi Leonard and the Los Angeles Clippers, owned by one of the world’s richest men, Steve Ballmer.

The league opened an investigation that remains ongoing, amid skepticism about how far it will go. No decisions were expected before All-Star Weekend in February, which will be hosted in Los Angeles at Ballmer’s Intuit Dome – a timing issue Silver was keen to avoid.

If the league opts for strict enforcement, the penalties could be severe, potentially affecting the Clippers, Ballmer and Leonard himself. The allegation is that Leonard demanded up to $28m in off-book payments to sign with the Clippers rather than rivals such as the Lakers or Toronto Raptors, the team he led to the 2019 title.

At stake is the integrity of the entire system. The salary cap underpins competitive balance, roster construction and even franchise valuations. Breaking it would create a black market in star recruitment, with incalculable consequences.

An uneasy embrace of gambling

In October, the NBA was rocked by one of the gravest crises in its recent history: a betting scandal that led to FBI arrests, including an active player, Terry Rozier; a coach, Chauncey Billups; and former player Damon Jones, who allegedly exploited his friendship with LeBron James to profit illegally.

The case exposed the risks of the league’s deepening relationship with legalized sports betting, once taboo and now a major commercial partner following widespread legalization in 2018. The NBA has partnerships with MGM, DraftKings and FanDuel, embedding betting into broadcasts, media narratives and technology.

Silver argues that regulation is safer than the shadows of illegality. Critics counter that the conflict of interest is obvious, especially when insiders sell information about injuries and lineups or manipulate individual statistics.

In December, the league announced new measures: tighter injury-reporting windows, updates every 15 minutes on game days, and restrictions on player-prop betting. The NBA insists leagues must control what bets are offered on their games – though doing so requires cooperation with betting partners that are also lucrative sponsors.

Tanking back in the spotlight

The NBA has once again turned its attention to tanking – front-office strategies designed to lose games and improve draft lottery odds. Players and coaches want to win; executives do not always share that priority.

After the Philadelphia 76ers institutionalized “The Process”, the league has repeatedly tried to curb tanking to protect the value of the regular season. New proposals include freezing future pick protections, locking lottery odds on March 1, or even banning teams from drafting in the top four in consecutive years.

Some argue the simplest fix would be to scrap the lottery altogether, as the NFL does, and assign draft order directly by standings. The NBA has long feared that would worsen tanking, but critics say the current system already punishes the worst teams while rewarding those closer to the playoffs, prolonging rebuilds and undermining the draft’s purpose.

Injuries everywhere – and no easy fix

Injuries have once again dominated the narrative this season, with stars sidelined in alarming numbers. Muscle injuries, particularly calf strains, have become increasingly common. They are rarely catastrophic at first, but are treacherous and can lead to far worse outcomes, including Achilles ruptures.

The modern NBA is faster than ever, with the highest pace since the late 1980s. Defensive rotations are constant, distances covered are greater, and three-point shots are taken from ever farther out. The physical toll is immense.

Measures such as the NBA Cup and the 65-game minimum for awards were introduced to maintain competitiveness, but they remain controversial. Nikola Jokic’s knee injury now threatens his MVP candidacy, just as Victor Wembanyama missed out on Defensive Player of the Year last season despite leading the league in blocks.

The underlying issue remains untouched: 82 games generate the money everyone depends on. Each game now brings in close to $3m. Cutting ten per team would mean billions lost. Owners, broadcasters and players all resist the idea.

As Erik Spoelstra put it bluntly: “It’s not going to change. It would only have changed if everyone had agreed to cut ten games. They didn’t, so there’s no solution.”